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THE RULES OF EVIDENCE IN EMINENT
DOMAIN
By FRED M. WINNER, of the Denver Bar

A comparison of a few of the reported cases with some of
the literature of the appraisal profession makes a harmonious
meeting of lawyers and appraisers seem but little less remarkable
than an amicable conference between Russia and the United States;
because, in the past, lawyers and appraisers have taken turns
exchanging insults. For example, in an eminent domain case, a
New York Supreme Court judge observed with reference to appraisers :'
But how are we to ascertain the (value). Are we to
rely simply upon the opinions of experts? Obviously not.
Facts, not the purchased opinions of professional witnesses, count with courts. The naked, arbitrary opinions
of men who call themselves "experts" are of little value.
. . .The long dissertation of these hired witnesses are
almost worthless.....
.. It must have been perfectly
apparent to the commissioners, as it is to the court, that
the figures of these pretended experts were merely the
wildest guesswork and speculation, furnishing no basis
whatever for a judicial determination. . . . In the ordinary claim for damages, I believe the experts are superfluity. They waste time, consume money, lumber up the
record, and befuddle the judgment of the commissioners.
. . . Experts have a knack of juggling figures and discoursing on hypothetical subjects, thus weaving a maze
of difficulties about the point in controversy, until one is
led in bewilderment from the simple obvious facts surrounding a situation. It is almost dangerous to listen to
them. However, it is the habit of courts to tolerate them
-a bad habit.
In reply, said Mr. George Schmutz, a leading authority in the
appraisal field, in discussing lawyer's contingent fees:2
It is indeed a strange condition where an appraiser
can prostitute his profession in this fashion and lose caste
among his fellow men; and yet the lawyer whose hands
are covered with the same tar, who is guilty of the same
fraudulent acts, is not considered dishonest by his fellow
lawyers.
It has been said, and it is a large installment of the
truth, that contingent fee employment of lawyers and
appraisers has done more to subvert justice than anything else. For this reason, among others, reputable ap'Sands et al. v. City of New York, 172 N. Y. S. 16.
'Schmutz. CONDEMNATION APPRAISAL HANDBOOK, 286 (1949, Prentice-Hall).
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praisers refuse such employment. It is high time that
so-called reputable attorneys did likewise.
Perhaps some of the misunderstandings between the professions results from a failure to bear in mind the fact that value
is the most elusive of all concepts, and, in the language of the
Second Circuit :3
As to value in condemnation cases, the Supreme
Court has said that often "the application of this concept
involves, at best, a guess by informed persons." But that
guess must have a rational foundation, and the owner
of the land must supply the court with materials for a
guess having such a foundation.
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that judicial decisions are far from uniform in determining what constitutes a
"rational foundation" for an "informed guess," and all too frequently the lawyer is confronted with the problem of trying to
outguess the trial judge or the appellate court as to what decision
will be made on a point of evidence, undetermined in the jurisdiction of the trial. If clients and if appraisers look with scorn at
the lawyer who advises that he can't tell what the local court will
decide, Cooper v. American Air Lines 4 is a case in point. In that
case, the Second Circuit was required to determine what the New
York Court of Appeals would hold in the future on a question
which had not been decided by the New York Courts, but on which
there was sharp conflict. In resolving the problem, the Court said:
We think this case is in that zone in which Federal
Courts must do their best to guess what the highest state
court will do.
Perhaps the guessing guide is this: What would be
the decision of reasonable intelligent lawyers, sitting as
judges of the highest New York Court, and fully conversant with New York "jurisprudence"? An alternative
test is what we conjecture would be the decision of the
particular judges who now constitute that Court. Probably the presumption is that the result of the two tests
would be identical.
Relying upon this authority, you can always explain to a
client or to your appraiser that you, as a reasonably intelligent
lawyer, know what the law should be; but that the question must
be determined by "'the particular judges who now constitute the
Court," and probably they will arrive at the correct result.
It is unfortunate, but it is true, that on most of the questions
of evidence arising in eminent domain there are never less than
two separate lines of authority, and probably the most that can
be accomplished is to point out a few of the problems which exist.
Westchester County Park Commission v. United States, 143 F. 2d 688.
F. 2d 355 (2nd Cir.).
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COMPETENCY OF THE WITNESS

We start with the general proposition that every eminent
domain case involves a question of value, and that value must
necessarily be established by opinion testimony. 5 Any witness
who, because of his familiarity with the value of the property
which is the subject of condemnation may express an opinion as
to that value, and the degree of familiarity required is largely a
matter for the discretion of the trial judge.; It is generally held
that "the opinion testimony of the owner of property, because o
his relationship as owner, is competent and admissible on the
question of the value of such property." 7 Nor need witnesses otherthan the owner necessarily be experts. The test of competency
is always whether the witness "shows such knowledge of the
values of comparable property in the vicinity as renders him able,
in the determination of the trial judge, to form an intelligent and
helpful judgment on the subject." 8 Under this rule, neighbors,
bankers, competitors and others who have peculiar knowledge
concerning values of the type of property in question in the community and who are familiar with the particular property have
been permitted to testify. 9
However, before these so-called "lay witnesses" may testify,
it is essential that it be shown both that they are familiar with
general market values in the area, and with the facts concerning
the particular property in question. This rule was thus stated in

People v. McReynolds :10
It is not sufficient that a real estate agent or a farmer
may have general knowledge of real estate values. He
must be familiar with the market price of similar land
in the same neighborhood and he should be acquainted
with the property involved in the suit.
Most of the problems of evidence, though, arise on the testimony of expert witnesses, and although it is subject to the same
limitations as is that of "lay witnesses," expert testimony also
faces many more hurdles. Most appraisers, whenever possible,
IPeople v. McReynolds, 31 Cal. App. 2d 219, 87 P. 2d 734; Viliborghi V.
Prescott, 55 Ariz. 230, 100 P. 2d 178.
OWassenich v. Denver, 67 Colo. 456, 186 P. 2d 333; Denver v. Lyttle, 106
Colo. 157, 103 P. 2d 1.
120 Am. Jur. 751, Sec. 892. See also: 32 C. J. S. 288, Sec. 545; Baltimore
American Ins. Co. v. Pecos Mercantile Co., (10th Cir.), 122 F. 2d 143; Telluride
Power Co. v. Williams, (10th Cir.), 164 F. 2d 685; Universal Insurance Co. v.
Arrigo, 96 Colo. 531, 44 P. 2d 1020; Loloff v. Sterling, 31 Colo. 102, 71 Pac. 1113;
Provo River Water Ass'n v. Carlson, 103 Utah 93, 133 P. 2d 777.
8 159 A. L. R. 7.
' See: 20 Am. Jur. 753, Sec. 897; 159 A. L. R. 7; U. S. v. Becktold, (6th Cir.),
129 F. 2d 743; Denver v. Lyttle, 106 Colo. 157, 103 P. 2d 1; Safranek v. Limon,
123 Colo. 330, 228 P. 2d 975.
2031 Cal. App. 2d 219, 87 P. 2d 734. See also: Langdon v. Loup River etc.
Dist., 144 Neb. 325, 13 N. W. 2d 168; Denver etc. Bank v. Board of Commissioners, 105 Colo. 366, 98 P. 2d 283; Wassenich v. Denver, 67 Colo. 456, 186 P. 533.
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use the three conventional approaches to value: (a) Comparable
sales, (b) Capitalization of income, and (c) Reproduction cost
less depreciation. Each approach has its individual evidentiary
problems, and there are usually two lines of authority to be considered.
THE SALES APPROACH

A. Sales of the Same Property
If not too remote in point of time, and if neither economic
conditions nor physical conditions have changed, it is uniformly
held that voluntary prior sales of the property which is the subject of the condemnation may be shown. The determination of
these qualifying factors is left largely to the discretion of the trial
judge, and his decision on admissibility is not likely to be upset.*"
B. Sales of Similar Property
Where the property is shown to be similar in fact, and where
the sales are not too remote in point of time, the majority rule
permits evidence of comparable sales on direct examination.1 2 A
A minority of the states hold that evidence of sales of comparable property is not admissible on direct examination, although
in most of these jurisdictions such sales may be inquired into on
cross-examination. 13 Courts favoring the admissability of evidence of sales of similar property have said that, "Such sales,
when made under normal and fair conditions, are necessarily a
better test of the market value than the speculative opinions of
witnesses; for, truly, here is where 'money talks.''14 On the other
hand, courts rejecting evidence of sales of similar property have
reasoned. "The fact as to what one may have sold or received for
his property is certainly a collateral fact to an issue involving
what another should receive, and, if in no way connected with it,
proves nothing. 15
This "collateral issue" objection of those courts refusing to
accept evidence of sales of similar property appears to have
been completely answered by Mr. Justice Holmes in one of his
typical, terse statements, ". .. so far as the introduction of collateral issues goes, that objection is a purely practical one, a concession to the shortness of life."' 6 Seemingly, the trend of the
"1 Orgel, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN, 581, Sec. 136. See also:
Thornton v. City of Birmingham, 250 Ala. 651, 35 So. 2d 545, 7 A. L. R. 2d 773,
and authorities cited therein.
"Jones v. United States, 258 U. S. 40, 42 S. Ct. 218, 66 L. Ed. 453; Loloff v.
Sterling, 31 Colo. 102, 71 p. 1113; Wassenich v. Denver, 67 Colo. 456, 186 P. 533;
Kistler v. Northern Colo. Water Dist., 126 Colo. 11, 246 P. 2d 616; Houston v.
Pillot, (Tex. Civ. App.) 73 S. W. 2d 585, and annotations in 118 A. L. R. 869
and 174 A. L. R. 386.
IThompson v. Stoakes, 46 Cal. App. 2d 285, 115 P. 2d 830; United States v.
Foster, (8th Cir.), 131 F. 2d 3; Villiborghi v. School District, 55 Ariz. 230, 100 P.
2d 178, and annotations cited in note 12.
14 City of Paducah v. Allen, 111 Ky. 361, 63 S. W. 981.
"East Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hiester, 40 Pa. 53.
,6Reeves v. Dennett, 145 Mass. 23, 11 N. E. 938.
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decisions is to admit evidence of comparable sales, and New York,
which was the leading exponent of the rule prohibiting such evidence, now permits its introduction. 7
In states where evidence of comparable sales is admitted on
direct examination, it is essential that the sales be of property
truly comparable to the property which is the subject of the condemnation. Although the requisite degree of comparability is
largely a matter within the discretion of the trial court 18 to permit the introduction of such evidence it must be shown that the
location of the property was generally the same, 19 and that the
size, use and character of the two properties were the same. For
example, the sales price of improved property should not be admitted to prove the value of unimproved property, 20 and the general characteristics and use should be similar. 21 The sales must
not be too remote in point of time, but the question of remoteness
is a question addressed to the the discretion of the trial judge, and22
the lower court's decision on this point is not likely to be upset.
Of course, to be admissible, it must be shown that
the sales were
2 3
voluntary, and truly reflected market conditions.
In a few cases, the argument has been made that since a
condemner pays cash, the only comparable sales which should be
permitted in evidence are cash sales. On today's real estate market, the cash sale is certainly the exception rather than the rule,
and, should this proposition be adopted, it would practically eliminate the use of comparable sales. On the other hand, it is equally
true that in the sale of many types of residential property, the
seller is selling "financing" rather than the property itself, and
liberal loan terms unquestionably command a higher price which
it may be unfair to assess against a condemner who is paying cash.
As might be suspected, the courts disagree, and some states allow25
evidence of sales with liberal financing 24 while others exclude it.
The question has frequently arisen whether sales of other

1"Compare: Robinson v. N. Y. El. R. R. Co., 175 N. Y. 219, 67 N. E. 431,
with Village of Lawrence v. Greenwood, 300 N. Y. 231, 90 N. E. 2d 53.
" Wassenich v. Denver, 67 Colo. 456, 186 P. 533; Houston v. Pillot, (Tex.
Civ. App.)

73 S. W. 2d 585, and cases cited in 118 A. L. R. 904 and 174 A. L. R.

386.
"Wassenich v. Denver, supra; re Graves, 182 Fed. 443; Ft. Worth v. Charbonneau, (Tex. Civ. App.) 166 S. W. 387, and A. L. R. annotations, n. 18.
20Re Housing Authority, 126 N. J. L. 60, 17 A. 2d 812; Citizens Nat. Bank
v. Slaton, (Tex. Civ. App.) 189 S. W. 742; Chicago etc. R. Co. v. Kline, 220 Ill.
334, 77 N. E. 229.

11Manning v. Lowell, 173 Mass. 100, 53 N.
SWassenich v. Denver, 67 Colo. 456, 186
(Tex. Civ. App.) 141 S. W. 2d 745; and A. L.
"Lewisburg v. Hinds, 134 Tenn. 293, 183

E.
P.
R.
S.

160.
533; Joyce v. Dallas County,
annotations, n. 18.
W. 985; Lanquist v. City of

Chicago, 200 Ill. 69, 65 N. E. 681; Phelps v. State, (Tex. Civ. App.)

157 S. W.

2d 955, and A. L. R. annotations, n. 18.
"Bartlett v. Medford, 252 Mass. 311, 147 N. E. 739; Sheehy v. Inhabitants
of Weymouth, 266 Mass. 165, 164 N. E. 819; Forest Preserve Dist. v. Barchard,
293 Ill. 556, 127 N. E. 878.

"Matter of City of New York, 278 N. Y. S. 412, affd. 278 N. Y. S. 430, affd.
198 N. E. 556.
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property in the area which is being condemned should be admitted.
The argument favoring them is to the effect that they are the
most recent, and, therefore, that they should be controlling. The
argument opposing the introduction of sales to the condemner is
summarized in Durel v. Public Service Co. :26
...where the question in issue is the market value
of land, evidence of condemnation prices of other tracts
of land is incompetent for the purpose of proving the
market value of the tract in question. Fundamentally,
this is because those other sales are regarded as being
little other than compromises, and the courts proceed on
the theory that in many instances the condemner is willing to pay more than the market value, or the owner is
willing to take less than the market value, in order to
avoid the trouble, annoyance and expense of a lawsuit.
Thus the rule is closely akin to the rule which forbids evidence of offers of compromise in the same suit.
The view of the Oklahoma Court excluding evidence of prices
paid by the condemner for other parcels is clearly the majority
rule, 2 and there is authority which even excludes evidence of
sales within the condemned area before the condemnation was
filed, but after the probability of condemnation was known.2 *
C. Offers to Purchase
The substantial weight of authority is to the effect that an
offer to purchase is not admissible, either in favor of or against
the property owner. The reason for the exclusion of offers to
purchase was explained in Sharp v. United States :29
In our judgment they (offers) do not tend to show
value, and they are unsatisfactory, easy of fabrication,
and even dangerous in their character as evidence upon
this subject. Especially is this the case when the offers
are proved only by the party to whom they are alleged
to have been made, and not by the party making them.
There is not chance to cross-examine as to the circumstances of the party making the offer in regard to good
174 Okla. 549, 51 P. 2d 517.
-United States v. T. V. A., (5th Cir.), 115 F. 2d 294; Phelps v. State, (Tex.
Civ. App.) 157 S. W. 2d 955; and A. L. R annotations, n. 18.
2 Denver v. Lyttle, 106 Colo. 157, 103 P. 2d 1.
191 U. S. 341, 24 S. Ct. 114, 48 L. Ed. 211; Loloff v. Sterling, 31 Colo. 102,
71 P. 1113; Abramson v. San Angelo, (Tex. Civ. App.) 210 S. W. 2d 476; annotation, 7 A. L. R. 2d 781. However, a few cases permit the introduction of
ofes See, fr..
ample, Chi.ago v.
ehmann, NG2 Ill. 46o, 1 04 N. E. 829: Kalamazoo v. Balkema, 262 Mich. 308, 233 N. W. 325; Tharp v. Massengill, 38 N. M.
58, 28 P. 2d 502, and 7 A. L. R. 2d 781. As to the possibility of showing such
offers on cross-examination to test credibility, see: Lloyd v. Venable, 168 N. C.
531, 84 S. E. 855; Central Pac. R. Co. v. Pearson, 35 Cal. 247; Spring Valley etc.
Co. v. Drinkhouse, 92 Cal. 528, 28 P. 781; Vineyard Grove Co. v. Oakbluffs, 265
Mass. 270, 163 N. E. 888.
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faith . . . A reference to the authorities shows them to
be almost unanimous against receiving evidence of this
kind.
Thus, under the great weight of authority, evidence of offers
to purchase is not admissible; yet, in an appraisal of property
made for any other purpose, an appraiser will always take into
account bona fide offers to purchase; and not infrequently crossexamination will develop that an appraiser took offers into account in his condemnation appraisal. Admitting that the court
should carefully scrutinize testimony concerning offers to purchase, it would seem that such evidence should be admitted,
par30
ticularly where there is but little evidence of actual sales.
D. Offers to Sell
Almost without exception, the courts have held that an offer
3
to sell property is not admissible on behalf of the property owner. 1
The reasons for the rule are summarized by the annotator in 7
A.L.R. 2d 781, 797:
The reasons for the exclusion of offers to sell as
evidence of market value are, in general, the same as
those applicable to offers to purchase, as reviewed above.
plus perhaps the fact that an owner offering to sell land
or listing it for sale often, and perhaps nearly always,
asks somewhat more for it than he really believes it to
be worth, or at least more than he would actually accept
for it. Then, too, the rule excluding evidence as constituting a self-serving declaration may well operate with
respect to one's offer to sell property for a certain price.
However, where the condemner seeks to show an offer to sell,
by the owner, the rule appears to be the exact opposite. The admissibility of an offer or an option against the property owner is
founded upon the proposition that such an offer may be received
as an admission against interest 32 and, as pointed out by Re
Simmons,3 3 an owner's offer is an "asking price" and not a "selling price," and there is every reason to believe that the offer establishes the upper limits of value, and should be admitted against
the owner.
Clearly, if such offers are admitted, they are subject to the
same limitations applicable to evidence of comparable sales concerning remoteness, similarity of the property in question and
economic conditions at the time of the offer as compared with
See: Chicago v. Lehmann, 262 111. 468, 104 N. E. 829.
"Mayers v. Alexander, 73 Cal. App. 2d 752, 167 P. 2d 818; Loloff v. Sterling,
31 Colo. 102, 71 P. 1113; Wichita Falls etc. Co. v. Cooper (Tex. Civ. App.) 235
S. W. 927, and annotation 7 A. L. R. 2d 795.
'People v. Ocean Shore R., Inc., 32 Cal. App. 2d 406, 196 P. 2d 570; Minneapolis-St. Paul v. Comm., 226 Minn. 282, 32 N. W. 2d 569.
"124 N. Y. S. 744.
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is always enthe time of condemnation, and the property owner
34
titled to explain the circumstances of the offer.
E. Offers Made by Condemner
The few cases which have considered the admissibility of
offers made by the condemner to purchase the property under
condemnation have almost uniformly excluded evidence of such
offers on the ground that they are privileged as an offer of compromise 3; and under the federal practice of filing a declaration
of taking supported by a deposit in court determined in advance
to be settled that the
by the government's appraisers, it seems
3 6
amount of the deposit cannot be shown.
In summary, then, under the great weight of authority, offers
are not admissible in favor of the property owner, whether they
are offers to purchase or offers to sell, and whether they are made
by or to the property owner; but, most jurisdictions allow the
condemner to show against the owner an offer to sell as an admissions against interest, and as evidence of the highest possible
value. However, upon such a showing being made by the condemner, the owner is entitled to explain away the offer, and before
such an offer can be shown against him, the owner can require
that the condemner establish that the condition of the property
and economic conditions are similar.
F. Admissibility of Tax Valuations
It is almost uniformly held that tax valuations determined by
an assessor are not admissible in evidence as proof of the value
of property taken in condemnation.3 7 The reason for the rule of
exclusion is shown by the frank admission of the Colorado court
38
where it is said, "It is a notorious
in Ft. Collins R. Co. v. France,
fact that the assessment of real property in this state, made by
county assessors, affords no criterion whatever of the value of
real property."
When, on the other hand, the property owner has himself
of
made a valuation of the property for tax purposes, a majority
39
This
the Courts admit the schedule as some evidence of value.
proposition was recognized by the Colorado court in Banker's Trust
Company v. International Trust Company,40 although the rule was
not applied because the schedules were unsigned. However, the
A. L. R. 2d 781.
"Metropolitan Street R. Co. v. Walsh, 197 Mo. 392, 94 S. W. 860.
s O'Donnell v. United States, 131 F. 2d 882; United States v. Foster, 131
F. 2d 3; Rumming Real Estate Co. v. United States, 122 F. 2d 892.
"Los Angeles v. Decon, 119 Cal. App. 491, 7 P. 2d 378; Kansas City R. Co.
v. Haake, 331 Mo. 429, 53 S. W. 2d 1485; D. & R. G. R. Co. v. Hickman, 45 Colo.
470, 101 P. 976; see annotations: 17A. L. R. 170, 84 A. L. R. 1485.
"41 Colo. 512, 92 P. 953.
,,Joyce v. Dallas County, (Tex. Civ. App.) 95 S. W. 2d 153; Wise v. City of
Abilene, 141 S. W. 2d 400; McCandless v. U. S., 74 F. 2d 596, and A. L. R. annotations, n. 37.
40 108 Colo. 15, 113 P. 2d 656.
347
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courts are somewhat reluctant to admit evidence of owner-prepared
tax valuations, and it seems that they will be rejected on the
slightest excuse. 41 Certainly, there can be no quarrel with the
legal reasoning that a sworn tax statement or tax protest constitutes an admission; yet, as a practical matter, everyone knows
that owners are not likely to set forth the full, fair, cash market
value if property is in a tax proceeding, and to admit tax schedules
or protests as evidence of value is of doubtful practical logic.
G. Admissibility of Insurance Valuations
By its very definition, insurance value is not market value,
and by common experience, few people insure their property for
its full worth. Insurance values, at best, consider only the value
of the improvements, and no valuation of land is included. Ac
cordingly, in the relatively few cases where insurance values have
been offered in condemnation proceedings, they have been excluded by the courts. 42 An interesting (but apparently undecided)
question is raised by a co-insurance clause in an insurance policy.
Typically, such clauses are based upon a representation by the
insured that the property is insured to at least 80% of value. Such
representations are always recent, and they constitute a statement
made by the property owner as to the value of his property. If
the separate valuation of the improvements cannot be excluded
under the "unit rule" and if the courts follow the reasoning applied in the tax cases where owner-valuations are received as an
admission against interest, it would seem that co-insurance valuations should be admitted.
H. Considerations of Zoning
It is fundamental that property being condemned should be
valued at its highest and best use or that its value should be
determined in view of all available uses.4 3 At the same time, speculative and unlikely uses cannot be used to build up value. 44 Is
valuation testimony then, limited to uses permitted by existing
zoning? Strangely, this question has not been frequently considered by the appellate courts, yet it is a question which is all too
often before the trial courts. The first extended discussion of the
11For example, in Dittbrenner v. Myerson, 114 Colo. 448, 167 P. 2d 15, where
an executrix filed a sworn petition setting forth a property valuation, the Court
held her statements did not constitute an admission because she simply
"adopted" an inheritance tax assessment.
I West Moreland Co. v. Public Service Comm., 293 Pa. 326, 142 A. 867.
43 Miss. & R. R. Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403, 25 L. Ed. 206; United
States v. Chandler-Dunbar etc. Co., 229 U. S. 53, 33 S. Ct. 667, 57 L. Ed. 1063;
Viliborghi v. Prescott School Dist., 55 Ariz. 230, 100 P. 2d 178; Wassenich v.
Denver, 67 Colo. 456, 186 P. 533; 1 Orgel, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN,
140, Sec. 30.
44 Morton Butler Timber Co. v. United States, 91 F. 2d 884; Forest Preserve
Dist. v. Wallace, 299 Ill. 476, 132 N. E. 444; Twin Lakes etc. Co. v. Colo. Midland
R. Co., 16 Colo. 1, 27 P. 258; Denver etc. Bank v. Board of Commrs., 105 Colo.
366, 98 P. 2d 283; 1 Orgel, VALUATION UNDER EMiINENT DOMAIN, 152, Sec. 31.
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problem is found in Long Beach City High School Dist. v. Stewart,4
where, by a 4-3 majority, the valuation testimony was limited to
uses permitted under existing zoning. The majority held that
there was insufficient evidence of a possibility of a change in the
zoning law to permit introduction of testimony as to the value of
land for commercial uses.
Within the past year, two other courts have reached opposite
conclusions, and have admitted testimony as to the value of property if used for purposes prohibited by zoning laws. Both cases
cited Long Beach v. Stewart, and both held that the California
decision was limited to its facts.
In Hall v. City of West Des Moines,4 6 the Court said:
In the case at bar there is evidence of some industrial
growth near the land in question . . . There is evidence
sufficient to permit the jury to find the territory is becoming an industrial development to some extent at least.
We think the question of adaptability for industrial uses,
with possible revision of the zoning ordinances, as an
element of value to be taken into consideration was a
proper one to be submitted as the trial court did.
4
The Texas Supreme Court held in City of Austin v. Cannizzo ,
that the admissibility of the testimony rested within the discretion of the trial judge:
We are unwilling to lay down a hard and fast rule
that in arriving at market value consideration may never
be given to a use for which property is reasonably suitable, and adaptable but which use is presently prohibited
by a zoning ordinance. It is a matter of common knowledge that cities frequently lift zoining ordinances or
reclassify property in particular zones when the business
or wants of the community justifies that type of action in
the interest of the general public welfare. At the same
time, we cannot announce a rule, except in general terms,
that should be applied in all cases where zoning ordinances or other legal restrictions existing at the time of
the taking prohibit the use of the property for purposes
other than those to which it is devoted. If the trial judge
is satisfied from the evidence as a whole that there is no
reasonable probability that existing restrictions may be
lifted within a reasonable time, he should exclude evidence of value based on use for any purposes other than
those to which it is restricted. On the other hand, if it
appears, reasonably probable to the trial judge that the
wants and needs of the particular community may result, within a reasonable time, in the lifting of restric30 Cal. 2d 763, 185 P. 2d 585, 173 A. L. R. 249.
m62 N. W. 2d 734.
1- 267 S. W. 2d 808.
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tions, he should admit testimony of present value based
on prospective use of the property for purposes not then
available.
The reasoning and conclusion in City of Austin v. Cannizzo
appear to be more consistent with the usual rule permitting the
introduction of testimony of value of the property devoted to its
best use than are the conclusions of the California Court. (However, as was pointed out by both the Iowa and Texas Court, the
California rule is probably about the same-the evidence was excluded in Long Beach v. Stewart simply on the facts there present.)
Unquestionably, a typical buyer takes into account the probability or possibility of zone changes, and if that probability or
possibility in fact enhances value, such an enhancement should be
available to the owner to be shown in a condemnation case. At
the same time, unless the showing is limited to situations where
the possibility of the change in zoning is sufficient to actually be
reflected in the market place, evidence of prohibited uses should
be excluded.
CAPITALIZATION OF INCOME

The capitalization of income approach is most frequently
used in the case of commercial properties, (although it can be
used for other types) ; and it, too, presents some real stumbling
blocks in the field of evidence, on which the courts have been unable to agree. As a general proposition, it can be safely said that
rental income can be shown, and that values can be determined
from a capitalization of rents. 48 On the other hand, it is equally
well settled that profits from a businss should not be capitalized
to determine value 49 although the opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Kinball Laundry Co. v. United States, ° gives pause as
to whether this is always the law in our highest court. However,
some courts permit an incidental showing of profits, not for the
purpose of capitalizing the profits to arrive at value, but for the
purpose of showing the adaptability of the property to the particular business use. 51
48Armory v. Commonwealth, 321 Mass. 240, 72 N. E. 2d 549; Sifuentes v.
United States, 168 F. 2d 264; Chicago R. Co. v. North Kansas Co., 134 F. 2d
264; Grand River Dam Authority v. Martin, 192 Okla. 614, 138 P. 2d 82; Farmers' Reservoir Co. v. Cooper, 54 Colo. 402, 130 P. 1004; Denver v. Quick, 108
Colo. 111, 113 P. 2d 999; Brazos River Dist. v. Costello, (Tex. Civ. App.) 169
S. W. 2d 977.
"United States v. Toronto Co., 338 U. S. 396, 70 S. Ct. 217, 94 L. Ed. 195;
East Bay Utility Dist. v. Lodi, 120 Cal. App. 740, 82 P. 2d 532; Denver v. Tondall,
86 Colo. 372, 282 P. 191; Hoover-Benninghoff v. Palisade, 48 Colo. 64, 108 P. 983;
NIcHoLs ON EMINENT DOMAIN, (2d ed.) vol. 2, p. 1173; but see: United States v.
257.654 Acres of Land, 72 F. Supp. 903, for a case where profits seem to have
been capitalized where the remaining plant could not be operated efficiently
by anyone after the taking.
50338 U. S. 1, 69 S. Ct. 1434, 93 L. Ed. 1765, 7 A. L. R. 2d 1280.
1 Sowers v. Schaeffer, 155 Ohio St. 454, 99 N. E. 2d 313; Burdick v. State,
92 N. Y. S. 2d 869; Stephenson Brick Co. v. United States, 110 F. 2d 360; Housing Authority v. Lustig, 139 Conn. 73, 90 A. 2d 169.
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Mr. Orgel, in his outstanding work on Valuation Under Eminent Domain, §163, discusses the unusual decision of the Texas
Court of Civil Appeals in Priolo v. City of Dallas,52 in which that
court held that under the Texas constitution it was error to exclude testimony which was based in part on profits. However,
after Mr. Orgel's book went to press, the Texas Supreme Court3
reversed the Court of Civil Appeals in City of Dallas v. Priolo,
and held the evidence inadmissible except in the case where there
is only a partial taking, and where the ownership of the land, improvements and business is identical. Following this decision of
the Supreme Court, the Court of Civil Appeals applied the usual
rule as to profits in Herndon v. Housing Authority of Dallas, 4 and
refused to permit testimony on profits where there was an entire
taking, without severance damage.
Thus, the rule seems to be well established that rentals, as
such, may be capitalized to determine value, while profits, as such
may not. If the income in question is clearly rent, it may be used,
and there is no problem; if the income in question is clearly business profit, it may not be used, and there is no problem. The difficulty arises when the income partakes of some of the characteristics of rent and of some of the characteristics of profit.
A. The Farm and Ranch Cases
Typical of this situation are the farm and ranch cases. Income from them is derived in one sense directly from the land,
and in this sense it is in the nature of rent. Yet the skill and industry of the farmer control to a large extent the amount of income, and in this sense the income is in the nature of profits.
As might be expected, the courts are divided on the admissibility
of testimony concerning farm and ranch income.
The leading case upholding the admissibility of this type of
testimony is City and County of Denver v,. Quick,5 5 where, after
recognizing the usual rule excluding evidence of business profits,
the Court admitted testimony on agricultural profits, saying:
The evidence thereof was offered and expressly admitted as proof bearing on the productiveness of the
land taken and its adaptability to livestock husbandry
and not as a basis for the determination of consequential damages for the destruction of a business as such.
5 6
The Quick case was folowed in State v. Cerruti,
and in
57
Herndon v. Housing Authority of Dallas, where it was said:
6-234 S. W. 2d 1014.
11150 Tex. 423, 242 S. W. 2d 176.
261 S. W. 2d 221.
108 Colo. 111, 113 P. 2d 999, 134 A. L. R. 1120.
188 Or. 103, 214 P. 2d 346.
5 261 S. W. 2d 221. For other cases in accord, see: Brazos River Dist. v.
Costello, (Tex. Civ. App.) 169 S. W. 2d 977; United States v. 443.6 Acres of
Land, 214 P. 2d 346. For cases contra, see: Papke v. Omaha, 152 Neb. 491, 41
N. W. 2d 751; De Freitas v. Town of Suisun, 70 Cal. 263, 149 P. 553.
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The rule above referred to (the rule excluding evidence of business profits) should not be confused with
the rule, accepted by most courts, which permits evidence of rents and profits derived from the intrinsic
nature of the real estate itself, as distinguished from
profits derived from a business operated on the land.
B. The Quarry and Mining Cases
Closely related to the farm and ranch cases are the quarry,
gravel and nining cases. Again the argument can be made that
the income is derived directly from the land, and that the same
rule should be followed in these cases as that followed in the farm
and ranch cases. Opposing the admissibility of the testimony are
the arguments: (1) The income represents profit from a business
enterprise; (2) Whether there is a market for the entire mineral
deposit is rank speculation; and (3) A separate valuation of the
minerals would violate the unit rule. It is hopeless to attempt to
reconcile the cases in this field, most of which are collected in an
annotation in 156 A.L.R. 1416, and about the most that can be
said is that some sort of evidence of the presence of minerals may
be offered, but exactly what kind and how much evidence is allowable is anybody's guess.5" However, a majority of the courts hold
that value cannot be determined by the simple process of multiplying the quantity of mineral by a fixed price, 9 and that under no
circumstances may profits from a going mining business be considered. Perhaps the true rule is expressed in National Brick Co.
v. United States :60
We think the inquiry should have been whether the
property was valuable in the open market for the sale of
sand or for the use of sand in the making of bricks; and
that in order to reach a fair conclusion in this respect
the jury should have been informed by competent witnesses as to the quantity of sand, the quality of the sand,
and the uses to which it might be put, whether there was
a market for it, and the value of the land with the sand
in that market in its then condition.
Although there seems to be little or no authority on the subject, the admissibility of this type of testimony would seem to be
even more necessary where the owner has leased the property
for a per ton or per yard rental. Surely, under circumstances
such as these, the income is derived directly from the land, and
it is in the nature of rent, rather than profits.
51See: Montana R. Co. v. Warren, 137 U. S. 348, 11 S. Ct. 96, 34 L. Ed. 681;
Twin Lakes etc. Syndicate v. Colorado Midland R. Co., 16 Colo. 1, 27 P. 258;
Herndon v. Housing Authority of Dallas, (Tex. Cix. App.) 261 S. W. 2d 223.
"156 A. L. R. 1423; Brett v. United States, 86 F. 2d 305; Hollister v. Cox,
131 Conn. 523, 41 A. 2d 93; Seathoff v. Highway Comm., 146 Kan. 465, 72 P.
2d 74.
"131 F. 2d 30.
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C. Possible Extensions of the Rule
Whether the courts will extend the doctrine that evidence
of income derived directly from the land is admissible remains to
be seen. For example, should evidence of income derived from
parking lot rentals be admitted? Presumably, the operations of
a parking lot requires no more business skill than the operation
of a farm or ranch, and the income is derived directly from the
land. In Ribak v. State,61 evidence of fair ground parking rentals
was excluded, but it was excluded because there was no showing
of a probability that the income would continue indefinitely into
the future. Such a showing could be made in support of a strategically located downtown parking lot, and it would seem that evidence of parking rentals should be admissible.
Then, too, the question is presented as to whether the denomination of the income as "rent" automatically makes it admissible.
In today's economy, percentage leases of commercial properties
have become very common. Ordinarily, lease income may be shown
without question 62 but in the case of a percentage lease, the
principal amount of the income results from a share of the gross
sales and sometimes from a share of the net profits. No cases
have been found deciding the question in eminent domain, but it
is inevitable that the question will come before the courts.
REPRODUCTION COST LESS DEPRECIATION

The last, and probably most unreliable, of the three typical
approaches to value is reproduction cost less depreciation. The
common disparity in bid prices on proposed buildings demonstrates
the inaccuracy of an estimated building cost; and, given an older
structure containing materials and equipment no longer on the
market, and built by methods long out of fashion, the estimated
"reproduction cost" is nothing more than guess, weighed by a
second guess as to the extent of physical depreciation. The resulting uncertainty is compounded by further adjustments for functional and economic obsolescence.
Nevertheless, although there is some authority to the contrary, 3 almost all courts permit evidence of theoretical reproduc6138 N. Y. S. 2d 869.
12Actual rentals paid may be shown. Sifuentes v. United States, 168 F. 2d
264; Dept. of Public Works v. Diggins, 374 Ill.. 11, 27 N. E. 2d 826; Farmers'
Reservoir Co. v. Cooper, 54 Colo. 402, 130 P. 1004. But reasonable rentals are
considered to be superior evidence to actual rentals. Chicago R. Co. v. North
Kansas Co., 134 F. 2d 142; Westchester Park Com. v. United States, 143 F. 2d
688; Mt. Vernon v. Centennial Church, 96 N. Y. S. 2d 764. But theoretical rent
on buildings to be constructed in the future are not admissible. Matter of City
of New York, 103 N. Y. S. 441; Louisiana Highway Comm. v. Paciera, 205 La.
784, 18 So. 2d 193; Greenspan v. Norfolk County, 264 Mass. 9, 161 N. E. 894;
Pullman Co. v. Chicago, 224 Il. 248, 79 N. E. 572. Unless there is a showing
the building would probably be constructed. Mattydale Shopping Center v.
State, 303 N. Y. 974, 106 N. E. 2d 259; U. S. 25.406 Acres of Land, 172 F. 2d 990.
0 Los Angeles v. Klinker, 219 Cal. 198, 25 P. 2d 826; Doughtery v. Allegheny
County, 370 Pa. 239, 88 A. 2d 73.
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tion cost of a structure.3. The cases do not seem to have discussed
at length the method which should be followed in estimating the
reproduction cost,65 but certainly a material quantity break-down
should be required, and rule of thumb methods using an average
cost per cubic foot or per square foot should not be permitted.
Orgel describes such methods as crude, "such a rule of thumb is
not even approximately accurate, except for a few highly standardized 'types' of structures; ' ' 66 while Jahr says, "Sometimes a
builder is hired to appraise the value of the structures by rule of
thumb; so much a cubic foot multiplied by the number of cubic feet
of building. Such an appraisal is worthless. It is not even approximately correct." 67
However, before reproduction costs may be received in evidence, there must be testimony that the building is well adapted
to the land on which it stands. If the building is so antiquated
that it must soon be destroyed, no evidence of reproduction cost
will be admitted.6 8 If this rule requiring adaptability is strictly
followed, the question is raised whether evidence of reproduction
costs is admissible in circumstances where the expert attributes
functional and economic obsolescence to the structure. The courts
have not distinguished between functional and economic depreciation, 69 but the appraisal profession does make a distinction.
Schmutz, in his Condemnation Appraisal Handbook, p. 77, says:
The primary reason for the division of obsolescence
into two groups is to segregate those items inherent in
the structure (functional) from those ouside of but environing it (economic.)
Both physical and functional
causes are inherent in the building; economic causes are
outside and independent of the building.
If an appraiser believes that the building in question is so
poorly adapted to the land that either economic or functional
obsolecence should be charged against its value, it would seem
that this finding should of itself render any testimony on reproduction cost inadmissable. Such a result is desirable. Reproduction
cost less mere physical depreciation includes enough estimates on
the part of the appraiser, and to add to these estimates arbitrary
percentage charges because of neighborhood conditions or because
the appraiser thinks the building is poorly arranged, or is an
"Albert Hanson Lumber Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 581, 43 S. Ct. 442;
Clark v. United States, 155 F. 2d 157; United States v. Becktold, 129 F. 2d 473;
Chesapeake R. Co. v. Johnson, 134 W. Va. 619, 60 S. E. 2d 203; State v. Doom,
(Tex. Civ. App.)

278

S. W.

255.

For two methods which were approved, see: re United States Commission
to Appraise Washington Market Co. Property, 295 F. 950.
06 Orgel, VALUATION
UNDER EALINENT Do,.NIuN, 34, Sec. 193.
67Jahr, LAW o5 EMINENT DOMAIN, 248, Sec. 157.
6 Devou v. City of Cincinnati, 162 F. 633; Bowie Lumber Co. v. United
States, 155 F. 2d 225; State v. Boyd, 129 W. Va. 715, 41 S. E. 665.
'Orgel,
VALUATION UNDER EMIINENT DOMAIN, Sec. 191; and see cases cited
n. 68.
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over-improvement, permits the wildest speculation on the part of
the jury, and it allows an appraiser to bolster by arbitrary guess
any value he has reached under the other approaches to value.
Another grave weakness of the approach of reproduction cost
less depreciation is the leeway available to the expert in estimating
so-called "overhead" charges in his cost figure. These costs, usually
estimated on a percentage basis, should be included, 7' but the
determination of the percentage to be used again offers a way to
bolster an appraisal made under some other approach. All in all,
reproduction cost less depreciation is most unsatisfactory, except in
the case of a comparatively new building of standardized construction. The method of valuation is recognized and permitted, but
the results are far from satisfactory, particularly with older
structures.
FIXTURES AND THE UNIT RULE

The "Unit Rule" is defined by Judge Learned Hand in United
States v. City of New York, 7 ' as one "which forbids the separate
appraisal of land and improvements upon it." Undoubtedly, threading their way through eminent domain cases are statements supporting such a "Unit Rule", but, as was said by Judge Hand, "All
that we can gather from the books is that the tribunal must be
strictly on guard that it has to do with an indivisible object of
transfer." If such a rule exists, it is ignored as often as it is
applied.
Condemnations of manufacturing plants present a serious
problem as to the condemner's liability to pay for the machinery
in the plant. The condemner has no use for the machinery; but,
if the machinery is old, the owner cannot afford to install the
machinery in a72 new, high cost building, and he will be required to
sell it as junk.
Except under special statutes permitting fixtures to be excluded from the taking, 73 it is well settled that the condemner must
74
pay for fixtures, physically or constructively annexed to th land. It
is equally well settled that in determining the character of a piece of
machinery, the rule applied between vendor-vendee governs. 75 Under the law of fixtures, as between vendor and vendee, the method
,"Banner Milling Co. v. New York, 191 N. Y. S. 143; Matter of City of New
York, 219 N. Y. S. 353; C. M. & S. R. Co. v. Hock, 118 Ill.587, 9 N. E. 205; re
United States Commission, 295 F. 950; Matter of City of New York, 89 N. Y. S.
2d 855.
71165 F. 2d 526, 1 A. L. R. 2d 870.
"Jackson v. State, 213 N. Y. 34, 106 N. E. 758.
"3 See: re Allen Street, 256 N. Y. 236, 176 N. E. 377; re Whitlock Avenue,
278- .
276, 16 N. E. 2d 281; United States v. Certain Land, 69 F. Supp. 815.
'418 Am. Jur. 891, Sec. 253; 29 C. J. S. 1044, Sec. 175, and cases cited therein.
See also cases cited infra.
1118 Am. Jur. 892, Sec. 253; LEWIS oN,-EINEN'r Do3IMA,- (3rd ed.) 1276, n.
27, Sec. 578; 29 C. J. S. 1044, Sec. 175, n. 88 (2); Jackson v. State, 213 N. Y. 34,
106 N. E. 758; United States v. Weiner, 210 F. 832; State v. Miller, (Tex. Ci.
App.) 92 S. AV. 2d 1073.
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of physical annexation of the machinery to the real estate is not
controlling, and instead, as is said in 22 Am. Jur. 715, Sec. 3:
The general course of modern decision in both English and American courts, is against the common law
doctrine that the mode of annexation of a fixture is the
criterion, whether slight and temporary or immovable
and permanent, and in favor of declaring all things to be
fixtures which are attached to the realty with a view to
the purposes for which it is held or employed. This has
led to the formulation and recognition of the following
general tests which may be applied in determining a
particular case: (1) Annexation to the realty, either
actual or constructive; (2) Adaptation or application
to the use or purposes to which that part of the realty to
which it is connected is appropriated; and (3) intention
to make the article a permanent accession to the freehold.
Moreover, it has been held in a condemnation case,7 6 that
"the intent of the parties is a controlling criterion in ascertaining
whether property is permanently attached to the land or retains
its identity as personalty." Necessarily, then, the determination
of whether a particular machine is or is not a fixture is a question
of fact to be determined by the jury.7 7 If the jury must determine
as to each machine the intent of the owner, as well as the extent
of physical annexation, the adaptability of the machine to the
building and the use to which it is put, then separate values must
be found as to each machine.
In other words, where machinery is involved in condemnation,
the so-called unit rule must be inapplicable, and the sum total of
the value of the land, the buildings, and the separate items of the
machinery which the jury finds to be fixtures must be determined.
To attempt to apply the unit rule to condemnations involving
machinery would require that the settled law as to fixtures be
ignored.
SOURCE OF THE EXPERT'S KNOWLEDGE

Under any of the approaches to value, the expert founds his
opinion, at least in major part, on what other persons have told
him. In most fields, an expert founds his opinion only on facts
within his personal knowledge, and his opinion should not rest
on what others have told him. 78 It is settled that if the expert
8
OLos Angeles v. Klinker, 219 Cal. 198, 25 P. 2d 826. See: United States v.
Becktold Company, 129 F. 2d 473, for a leading case.
7, 22 Am. Jur. 798, Sec. 77; Miller v. Waddingham, 91 Cal. .377, 27 P. 750;
Lakeside Resort Co. v. Sprague, 274 Mich. 426, 264 N. W. 851; Philadelphia etc.
Co. v. Miller, 20 Wash. 607, 56 P. 382.
" Jones, COMMENTARIES ON EVIDENCE, 2d ed. 2442, Sec. 1335; Security Benefit
Ass'n v. Small, 34 Ariz. 458, 272 P. 647; Reed v. Barlow, (Tex. Civ. App.) 157
S. W. 2d 933'; Ingles v. People, 92 Colo. 518, 22 P. 2d 1109.
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founds his opinion as to values on recited considerations in deeds
or on revenue stamps, the testimony is not admissible, 79 and some
courts have held that an expert may not consider any transaction
other than those of which he has personal knowledgeso
The question is squarely presented by two late federal cases
reaching exact opposite conclusions, and, since the second case,
is now pending in the United States Supreme Court, we should
soon have an authoritative pronouncement on the subject. In
United States v. 5139.4 Acres of Land,8t the Fourth Circuit, speaking through Judge Parker, held it was error to refuse to permit
an expert to testify to the details of sales he had learned about in
the course of his investigation. It was held:
The witness within reasonable bounds should have
been allowed to give the jury the facts upon which his
opinion as to value was based; and it would unduly hamper the production of such testimony and needlessly prolong the trial to require that the sales be proved with the
particularity that would be necessary in suits to enforce
the contracts relating thereto. The hearsay and best
evidence rules are important, but they should not be
applied to prevent an expert witness giving in a reasonable way the basis of his opinion . .. Although there is
some conflict in the decisions, we think the better rule
is that where the opinion of an expert witness is based
in part on such sales, he should be permitted to give the
details of the sales upon which he bases the opinion, although the facts so stated do not become independent
evidence.
Expressly refusing to follow United States v. 5139.5 Acres of
Land, the First Circuit, speaking through Judge Woodbury, held
in United States v. Katz :82
Since (the circumstances of the sale) are all matters
of which persons with only hearsay knowledge of a sale
can be expected to know little or nothing, whereas those
with firsthand knowledge, such as a party to the sale
itself or the broker or agent who affected it, can be expected know at least something, we think the hearsay
rule should be adhered to in the interest of justice to
both parties. Nor does information as to prices gleaned
from the recitations of consideration in deeds in the
Registry, or revenue stamps affixed thereto, give any
real help in arriving at value. More often than not the
true consideration paid is not stated in a deed, there appearing only a formal statement of consideration. And
"City and County of Denver v. Quick, 108 Colo. 111, 113 P. 2d 999.
8oCity of Elmhurst v. Roymeyer, 297 Ill.
430, 130 N. E. 761.
81200 F. 2d 659.
0213 F. 2d 799.
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the value of the revenue stamps affixed to a deed is determined by the consideration paid exclusive of the value
of liens or encumbrances at the time of the sale...
It is true that the specialized knowledge of expert
witnesses is usually derived in part, and may be derived
wholely, from hearsay sources, such as statements in
text books and the instruction imparted by teachers and
others in the particular field involved. But it does not
follow from this that an expert witness may bolster his
ultimate opinion of value by telling the jury what others
told him. The principle was succinctly expressed by Mr.
Justice Holmes when Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in National Bank of Commerce v. City of New Bedford, 175 Mass. 257, 56 N.E.
288, 290, wherein he said: "An expert may testify to
value, although his knowledge of details is chiefly derived from inadmissible sources, because he gives the
sanction of his general experience. But the fact that an
expert may use hearsay as a ground of opinion does not
make the hearsay admissible." The reason for the rule
is obvious. Any expert deserving the name must of necessity assimilate prior learning, rejecting some and accepting some as his experience dictates, and to permit
him on direct examination to develop the hearsay basis
for his opinion would lead the trial astray into a host of
collateral issues which could only obscure the main one
and needlessly prolong the trial.
The admissibility of the expert's testimony on other sales
prices was the only point decided in United States v. Katz, and
certiorari was applied for, but, unfortunately, the Supreme Court
did not accept jurisdiction.
The arguments both for and against the admissibility of the
Lestimony are strong. In support of its admissibility is the argument that the parties to every sale would have to be called, and
condemnation trials would° be unduly prolonged, but, as was said
by Mr. Justice Holmes in Reeve v. Dennett,83 this "objection is a
purely practical one, a concession to the shortness of life." Opposing the admissibility of such testimony is the undeniable fact that
circumstances of the sale cannot be proven-the expert can compile a list of transactions in support of his opinion, but the true
comparability of his sales and rentals cannot be tested by crossexamination.
THE DIscovERY PROCEDURE
This uncertainty could probably be resolved under the discovery procedure prevailing in the federal courts and in many of
our states. But, the availability of the discovery procedure to
ferret out the basis of the expert's opinion in advance of trial,
13

145 Mass. 23, 11 N. E. 938.
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is again a subject with conflicting decisions. In some jurisdictions
it is held that discovery is fully available for this purpose,84 while
in others, the "work product rule" has been extended to prevent
the disclosure of such information. 5 If an expert is to be permitted to give hearsay testimony on the comparable transactions
he uses in support of his opinon, the discovery procedure should
be permitted the other side to the fullest extent. Otherwise, both
condemner and owner are at the mercy of the other side's expert
-they cannot cross-examine as to the circumstances of the sale,
because the expert has no personal knowledge, and if discovery is
not available to them, they cannot prepare in advance of trial and
demonstrate that the transactions used by the expert are unfair.
Additionally, in states requiring good faith negotiation prior
to condemnation, the owner should be entitled to examine the
condemner's appraisal to prove or disprove good faith negotiation.
Such negotiation is generally held to be a condition precedent to
the acquisition of jurisdiction by the court,8 6 and the property
owner should be entitled to test out this jurisdictional fact through
the discovery procedure.
CONCLUSION

In last analysis, the rules of evidence in condemnation are far
from settled, and both counsel and appraisers are faced with a
difficult task in attempting to prepare for trial. Without attempting
to lay down any hard and fast rules, the principles of admissibility
of evidence which should control are well stated in United States r.

25,406 Acres of Land :87

It is difficult to perceive why testimony which experience has taught is generally found to be safely relied upon by men in their important business affairs outside, should be rejected inside the courthouse . . . (but)
. . . we do not mean to say, of course, that an expert
witness should be allowed to roam at large in the realms
of fancy and testify at length about hypothetical developments and mythical income to be realized therefrom.
When this is attempted it should be firmly suppressed
because of its tendency to mislead and confuse and the
waste of time involved.
States v. 50.34 Acres of Land, 13 F. R. D. 19.
85Hickey v. United States, 17 F. R. Serv. 33.
'aStalford v. Board of County Commisisoners, 128 Colo. 441, 363 P. 2d 436.
87172 F. 2d 990 (4th Cir.).
'4United
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